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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INFERENCE OF RETAINED LIFE INTEREST UNDER SECTION 2036 (A) - In 1936 decedent established an irrevocable trust naming herself and relatives as beneficiaries. The corporate
trustees were directed to pay the trust income, in the exercise of their
absolute discretion, either to the settlor or to the other beneficiaries. In
filing her 1936 federal gift tax return settlor attempted unsuccessfully to
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exclude the value of a life estate in the trust income, allegedly retained
by her. At her death, the value of the trust corpus was not included in
her estate tax return. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency1 contending
that decedent-settlor had retained for her life the "possession or enjoyment"
of, or the "right to income from" the trust corpus within the meaning of
the forerunner of section 2036 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2
Plaintiff argued that since the trust was irrevocable and the trustees were
vested with absolute discretion, settlor had retained nothing which could
properly be included in her estate. In an action for refund of federal
estate taxes, held, dismissed. Although a discretionary trust is ordinarily
excluded from a decedent's gross estate, where the settlor had in fact received all the income for her life and acted in the belief that she had a
life interest in such income, an informal prearrangement to exercise discretion in favor of the settlor will be inferred. As such, the trust corpus
must be included in the deceased settlor's estate. Estate of Skinner v.
United States, 197 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1961), appeal taken by taxpayer
to Third Circuit, CCH FED. EsT. & GIFr REP. 9007.
The decision in the principal case is illustrative of the broad scope of
section 2036 (a) , a provision requiring inclusion in one's estate of inter
vivos transfers of property in which decedent had retained "the possession
or enjoyment," or, in the alternative,3 "the right to income." Such transfers,
although inter vivas, are considered, for tax purposes, as being essentially
akin to testamentary dispositions. Although the provision is described as
dealing with the retention of a "life interest," it has been construed to encompass more than the life estate known to property law.4 As such, the
word "enjoyment," used in the setting of section 2036 (a), connotes "substantial present economic benefit," 5 rather than the technical vesting of
title. However, since no more explicit definition of the language "possession or enjoyment" has been formulated, its use in the application of section 2036 (a) has not yielded uniform results in connection with avoidance
litigation.
This problem is illustrated by the history of the section preceding the
decision in the principal case. Generally it has been held that where one
A credit was allowed for the amount paid as a gift tax in 1936.
INT. REY. ConE OF 1954, § 2036 (a) (1) , successor of Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 811 (c) (I) (B) (i) , under which the principal case was decided.
s Estate of Uhl, 25 T.C. 22 (1955). See also 3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFI' TAXATION § 24.08 (1959).
4 E.g., Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958); Wells Fargo Bank&: Union
Trust Co. v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1948); Estate of Holland v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942) • See generally LOWNDES &: KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFI' TAXES, 130-73 (1st ed. 1956). See also Covey, Section 2036-The New Problem
Child of the Federal Estate Tax, 4 TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. 121 (1960).
5 Commissioner v. Holmes' Estate, 326 U.S. 480 (1946); Silverman v. McGinnes, 259
F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958).
1

2

662

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

creates an irrevocable trust vesting in the trustee absolute discretion over
corpus and income, such transfer is a completed gift inter vivas and is
not includible in the decedent-settlor's gross estate, although he perhaps
may have received incidental benefits after the transfer. 6 However, where
by the terms of the trust the exercise of discretion in favor of the settlor
is governed by some external standard which a court may apply in compelling the exercise of that discretion, 7 or where the trust is created to
discharge a legal obligation of support,8 or where it can be reached by
creditors,9 it has been held that there is a retention of interest in the property sufficient to satisfy the "enjoyment" requirement of section 2036 (a) .10
In such circumstances it is obviously tempting for one to combine a transfer such as an absolute discretionary trust, complete on its face, with an
informal agreement allowing the retention of benefits by the settlor in an
attempt to escape the estate tax on the property held in trust.11 In coping
with this problem, courts have looked to the substance of such a transfer,
its realities and not mere form, to determine its true character for tax
purposes. 12 Thus, in Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner13 it was held
that a decedent who conveyed income-producing real estate with no reservation of rents, and simultaneously entered into oral agreements with his
children under which he received rents until his death, had in fact retained
the "enjoyment" of the property, and therefore, it should be included
in his gross estate.
The holding in the principal case carries the proposition in McNichol
one step further, by allowing the existence of such prearranged oral agreement to be inferred from the receipt of income, rather than requiring it
to be established by direct proof. 14 From the standpoint of combatting
6 See, e.g., In re Uhl's Estate, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Commissioner v. Irving
Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Commissioner v. Douglass' Estate, 143 F.2d 961
(3d Cir. 1944). See also Comment, 38 N.C.L. REv. 638 (1960) .
7 Estate of Boardman, 20 T.C. 871 (1953) .
s Colonial-American Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1957);
Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 871 (1953);
Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank 8e Trust Co., 111 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1940);
Estate of Lee, 33 T.C. 1064 (1960).
9 Commissioner v. Vander Weele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958). Cf. Estate of Uhl,
25 T. C. 22 (1955), rev'd and remanded, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957) .
10 For other illustrations of the indirect retention of income, see 3 MERTENS, supra
note 3, at § 24.09.
11 E.g., Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 3.'>6 U.S. 274 (1958); Greene v.
United States, 237 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1956); Estate of Bergan, l T.C. 543 (1943). See
also 43 MINN. L. REv, 354 (1958) •
12 Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Commissioner v. Wilder's
Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Wells Fargo Bank 8e Union Trust Co. v. United
States, 80 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1948) ; Estate of Schwartz, 9 T.C. 229 (1947); Estate
of Holland v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942) •
13 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959) , 19 MD. L. REv. 348. See also Covey, supra note 4, at 126.
14 But cf. Burrill v. Shaughnessy, 71 F. Supp. 99, 101 (N.DN.Y. 1947) "To draw the
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avoidance of section 2036 (a) the court's attitude is justifiable. First, in
requiring the inclusion of the trust corpus in decedent's estate, the fact
that settlor thought she had a life interest in the income from the trust
is certainly significant, as a factual matter, to the inference of a prearrangement. Secondly, and more essential to the result, the court reasoned that
since decedent-settlor had in fact received all income paid from the trust
during her lifetime, she may properly be said to have retained the "enjoyment" of the property. However, the legislative history behind section
2036 (a) may subject this rationale to question; for it indicates that the
language "possession or enjoyment" was intended to have reference only
to a power over non-income-producing property,15 whereas in the instant
case, income-producing assets comprised the trust corpus. Such being the
intent of Congress,16 it would seem that the court should not have based
taxability upon the retention of "possession or enjoyment" but rather upon
the settlor's retention of the "right to income."17 This the court refused
to do, saying that the presence of an absolute discretion in the trustees
necessitated the conclusion that settlor had retained no legally enforceable
right. But the regulations treat a right as having been retained "if at the
time of the transfer there was an understanding, express or implied, that
the interest or right would later be conferred." 18 Moreover, the congressional reports indicate that the words "right to" merely clarify the scope
of section 2036 (a) 19 and do not require a legally enforceable right for taxability.20 Thus, although the decision did not follow congressional intent
by limiting the term "possession or enjoyment" to non-income-producing
inference requested • • . is • • . to hold that the existence of a family relationship
in itself is a handicap to one's right to contract or • • • express the virtue of unselfishness." See also McCullough v. Granger, 128 F. Supp. 6ll (W.D. Pa. 1955) •
15 H.R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1949) . "The income interests described in Section 2036 (a) . . . include reserved rights to the income from transferred
property and rights to possess or enjoy non-income producing property." See also
LOWNDES 8e KRAMER, supra note 4, at 168, "Although Section 2036 (a) (2) includes the
right to designate, not only income, but also the possession or enjoyment of the property, the Regulations appear to restrict the right to 'possess or enjoy' the property to
a power over non-income producing property."
16 But see Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959) ;
Struthers v. Kelm, 218 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955). In these cases the application of
"enjoyment" was not limited to non-income-producing property, though this point was
not argued.
17 See Harter v. United States, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1964 (N.D. Okla. 1954).
18 Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1-a-ii (1958).
10 The insertion of the words "right to" were intended to make it clear that the
provision covered cases in which the decedent had the right to income but did not
actually receive it. See S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 50 (1932).
20 The following cases stand for the proposition that the "right to income" provision
of § 2036 (a) imposes a factual and not a legal test of liability: Estate of Shearer, 17 T.C.
304 (1951); Estate of Fry, 9 T.C. 503 (1947); Estate of Schwartz, 9 T.C. 229 (1947) . But
cf. Estate of Trafton, 27 T.C. 610 (1956) •
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property, it could have done so and still required the inclusion of the
corpus in the gross estate.
Nevertheless, the principal case is significant in illustrating a rather
unique application of section 2036 (a) , and in permitting the inference of
an agreement which made the "retention" here a taxable one. Although
the court failed to give effect to the congressionally-proposed dichotomy
between income and non-income-producing property, such a distinction
will probably never be determinative, as a practical matter, of the outcome
of litigation. However, when viewed from the standpoint of the desirability of maintaining the integrity of the death tax statute, the principal
decision serves to check a possible means of avoidance under section
2036 (a) , and, as such, seems justifiable.
Donald E. Vacin

